The Role of a Free Press in Combating Business Corruption by Binhadab, Nouf et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Role of a Free Press in Combating
Business Corruption
Nouf Binhadab and Michael Breen and Robert Gillanders
Dublin City University
September 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88954/
MPRA Paper No. 88954, posted 15 September 2018 07:45 UTC
1 
 
The Role of a Free Press in Combating 
Business Corruption *
Abstract: Using firm-level data, we find that countries with greater press freedom have 
significantly lower incidences of bribery involving public officials. In particular, we find that 
a free press is associated with a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms that report 
corruption during interactions with tax officials and when obtaining construction permits. 
Furthermore, we find that fewer businesses in these countries report that corruption is the 
biggest problem that they face. These findings underline the role of an independent media in 
combating corruption. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2017, Telia Co AB agreed to pay penalties of at least $965 million to the United States and 
international authorities after the media uncovered corrupt payments involving telecom 
contracts in Uzbekistan (Schoenberg and Dolmetsch, 2017). In 2016, VimpelCom Ltd. agreed 
to pay $835 million to settle a case following a media investigation of corrupt payments 
(Scannell, 2016). Cases of this kind illustrate the important role that the media and investigative 
journalists play in helping societies to detect and punish corruption. Existing studies appear to 
confirm this role, finding that press freedom is associated with perceived corruption and that 
media attention can plausibly reduce corruption through several channels, including enhanced 
corporate governance. 
Our study is the first to address this question using data on firms’ involvement in corruption. 
We use data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, a series of global surveys that contain 
data on firms’ direct experience of corruption, including bribery and the degree to which 
corruption is seen an as obstacle to doing business. Previous work has used broad measures of 
corruption perceptions such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI). As the CPI is based on expert opinions, it may give a misleading impression that press 
freedom has a greater influence on corruption than in reality. Furthermore, it is subject to 
perception biases (Svensson, 2003; Reinikka and Svensson, 2006; Fan, Lin and Treisman, 
2009) and makes no distinction between grand and petty corruption. The overall level of 
(perceived) corruption has received much attention, with studies finding that it has many 
undesirable economic and social effects.1 Petty corruption warrants further attention, as it is a 
common feature of day-to-day business across the world. Globally, 18 per cent of firms 
surveyed by the World Bank between 2004 and 2017 report experiencing at least one bribery 
request, and 7 per cent of this sample report that corruption is their biggest obstacle to doing 
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business. Furthermore, we know little about which type of corruption the media is the most 
effective at constraining. By studying business corruption in different contexts, we are able to 
observe that press freedom is more effective in collusive interactions than situations involving 
harassment by public officials. 
We find that a free press reduces substantially business corruption across multiple indicators 
of both press freedom and corruption. Using the percentage of firm-state interactions in which 
a bribe was expected or requested as a proxy for firms’ engagement with corruption, we show 
that firms in countries with a free press report substantially less corruption. Moreover, we show 
that a free press is associated with fewer businesses in these countries reporting that corruption 
is the biggest problem that they face. Additionally, we find that a free press is associated with 
a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms that say a bribe was expected or requested 
during interactions with tax officials. This latter finding is in line with the content of the 
Panama and Paradise papers, which have revealed the use of offshore financial centers for 
illegal purposes such as tax evasion and fraud.2 
Our findings have several implications. First, they suggest that a free press may reduce 
significantly the cost of doing business, as previous studies find that bribery imposes large 
costs on business (Kaufman and Wei, 1999).3 Second, our findings add to the substantial 
literature on the importance of a free press in combating corruption by showing that this 
association is evident when we measure corruption using firms’ experiences. Finally, our 
results underline the importance of understanding the media environment for firms engaging 
in cross-border activities. 
This article is organized as follows. First, we review the literature on the role of the media as a 
monitor of corruption. We then proceed to outline our data, method, and results. The results 
are presented in two parts: the first presents our findings regarding the overall association 
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between corruption and press freedom and the second describes the findings from models that 
interact press freedom with the level of democracy. We conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of our findings for research and policy. 
2. The Media as a Monitor of Corruption 
2.1 Theory 
The notion that an independent media can play an important role in controlling corruption has 
good theoretical support. The Becker (1968) model of crime suggests that would-be criminals 
weigh up the expected costs against the expected benefits of crimes. The model finds that 
would-be criminals are dissuaded from committing a crime if the punishment or likelihood of 
detection increases. To the extent that an independent media increases the likelihood of being 
caught (and imposes reputational cost), a free press should act as a deterrent to individuals 
contemplating committing a crime. In our study, these individuals are either public officials 
who elicit bribes from businesses through extortive corruption or businesses who offer bribes 
to obtain favourable treatment, whether through collusion with public officials – collusive 
corruption – or in response to extortive corruption. The role of the press in moderating 
corruption rests critically on the assumption that such individuals are sensitive to relatively 
small changes in the odds of detection. In an experimental bribery game, Abbink et al. (2002) 
present findings which support this assumption, showing that a very small chance of being 
caught, combined with a severe punishment, reduces significantly the likelihood of offering or 
accepting a bribe. Since giving or receiving a bribe is a criminal act in most jurisdictions, the 
more the media increases the odds of detection, the less firms should engage in corruption.  
There are two relevant literatures which support the link between press freedom and corruption 
in business. The first literature finds a strong relationship between press freedom and the 
perception of corruption.4 Brunetti and Weder (2003), for example, argue that press freedom 
can be used as an external control on corruption, and test this argument using cross-country 
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data on 125 countries over the period 1994-1998. They find that an improvement in press 
freedom of one standard deviation reduces corruption by 0.4-0.9 points (on a scale from 0 to 
6). Adsera et al. (2003) find that a well-informed electorate, as captured by the interaction of 
newspaper circulation and democracy, explains between one-half and two-thirds of the 
variance in the levels of governmental performance and corruption, using panel data on 100 
countries in the period 1980-95, and a cross-national analysis of indicators of corruption and 
governance effectiveness for 1997-1998. Recent work has extended the literature to incorporate 
alternative estimation strategies (Freille et al. 2007), the role of socio-political integration 
(Charron, 2009), and the joint impact of democracy and press freedom on corruption 
(Chowdhury 2004; Kalenborn and Lessmann, 2013). We consider the democracy strand of the 
literature in further detail in Section 5. 
The second relevant literature highlights the relationship between the media and firm 
behaviour. This literature suggests that media attention may reduce business corruption through 
several channels. First, it may put pressure on directors and managers to act in line with 
acceptable social norms such as honesty and integrity. Dyck et al. (2008), for example, find 
that coverage in the Anglo-American press increases the probability that a Russian firms’ 
corporate governance violation is reversed. Jaakson et al. (2018) find that business managers’ 
opinions regarding corruption are influenced by normative concerns. While these studies link 
media attention to corruption, there are many further studies which highlight its link to other 
relevant dimensions of firm behaviour that often feature in corruption-related scandals. Bednar 
(2012), for example, shows that media attention is an important determinant of CEO job 
security, executive compensation, and board membership.  
Second, media attention has been shown to have a remarkable impact on firms’ practices and 
corporate policies. El Ghoul et al. (2016) show that firms engage in more Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) activities if located in countries where the media has more freedom. 
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Krishnamurti et al. (2018) find that firms that are more engaged in CSR activities are less 
exposed to corruption risk. Furthermore, they find that in emerging countries, CSR engagement 
reduces corruption risk only when press freedom is in place. Kanagaretnam et al. (2018), 
demonstrate that a privately owned and competitive media sector is associated with a lower 
probability of aggressive tax behaviour. Collins et al. (2009) find that some executives 
rationalize acts of corruption; thus, to the extent that a free press exposes the damage done by 
corruption, it could make such rationalising more difficult. 
Finally, media attention and its attendant impact on public pressure is often critical in 
catalyzing support for anti-corruption initiatives. For example, following a number of financial 
scandals in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, such as the collapse of Maxwell Group and the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
Committee was created in response to media and public opinion.5 
2.2 The Problem with Corruption Perceptions 
All of the studies which explore the relationship between press freedom and corruption use 
indices based on expert opinions of country-level corruption such as the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) or Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). While 
the CPI and other indicators have been useful resources, many researchers argue that they are 
potentially misleading in some contexts. Svensson (2003), Reinikka and Svensson (2006), 
Treisman (2007), and Fan et al. (2009) argue that they suffer from perception biases. Knack 
(2007) and Kenny (2009) argue that they lag reality. Finally, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 
(2010) find ideological and cultural biases in experts’ evaluations of corruption in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
As well as these known biases, expert indices are particularly problematic in the context of our 
study; that is, the expert opinions that feed into the CPI may respond to press freedom 
independently of actual corruption levels, predisposing the index to be correlated with press 
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freedom. This is because experts rely on information to form opinions and may perceive the 
absence of a free press, along with other restrictions on information, as evidence of 
malfeasance, regardless of actual corruption levels. Without recourse to data on actual 
corruption levels, we cannot be certain that a free press reduces corruption. A free press may 
influence corruption perceptions even if the media is ineffective at curbing real corruption. 
Indeed, there is no shortage of studies which question whether the media is doing a good job, 
particularly in societies where it is highly polarised and tends to value hypercritical 
infotainment over critical impartiality and investigative journalism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
Finally, even if one considers the CPI to be a valid indicator of actual corruption, it is not ideal 
for studying corruption in business because it does not distinguish between grand and petty 
corruption. The media may direct its gaze disproportionately on grand corruption or corruption 
that preys on particular individuals, while neglecting less sensational types of everyday 
corruption. An association between press freedom and one type of corruption does not imply 
an association with the other. 
2.3 Firms’ Corruption Experiences 
Increasingly, scholars are turning to survey-based approaches to measure the level of 
corruption in different contexts. An appropriately-designed survey of households or firms can, 
according to Knack (2007: 257) ‘place a greater emphasis on experience and less on 
perceptions.’ Such survey data has given rise to a plethora of new studies exploring corruption 
in business, including the determinants of bribery in Asian firms (Wu, 2009), how the gender 
of owners and managers affects bribery (Breen et al., 2017), and how bribery affects firm 
growth (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Furthermore, such data allows us to consider how press 
freedom affects corruption in the different contexts in which a business may have dealings with 
the state. In some contexts, acts of corruption are more likely to be extortive than collusive. 
Brunetti and Weder (2003) argue that the free press is the most effective institution for 
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combating collusive corruption because internal control agencies such as the police or another 
branch of the public service, may be vulnerable to capture or to being paid-off. Not only does 
the press have a particular role to play in principle, competitive forces may drive it to fulfil this 
role in practice. The incentives of journalists to investigate different types of corruption differ. 
It may be the case that a story about the solicitation of bribes for electricity connections is less 
newsworthy and valuable than a story about a conspiracy to reduce tax payments or bypass 
construction regulation. 
By studying corruption across different contexts in business we are able to observe whether 
press freedom reduces corruption across the board, or if it helps only in the more newsworthy 
collusive cases. Again, the distinction between these types of corruption is not made in the 
ICRG or CPI, whereas the data that we employ allows us to look at corruption in different 
contexts, some of which are more likely to be collusive arrangements than others. 
In summary, many studies find a strong link between press freedom and corruption perceptions 
but no previous work examines this topic from the perspective of firms’ experiences. On the 
one hand, the existing literature provides a clear mechanism through which business corruption 
should be reduced by a free press, through its disciplining on businesses and public officials. 
On the other hand, the inherent problems with the CPI and other perception indicators suggest 
that the role of press freedom may have been overstated. By using arguably more objective 
measures of corruption, and exploring business corruption across several contexts, we are able 
to demonstrate that this fear is largely unfounded. 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1 Measuring Corruption 
We measure corruption using the World Bank Enterprise surveys, which are representative 
surveys of formal firms in the manufacturing and services sectors. From these surveys, we use 
two measures of firms’ involvement in corruption. The first, Bribe, is the percentage of public 
9 
 
transactions in which a gift or informal payment was requested or expected by a public official. 
The survey questions upon which this percentage is based take the following form: ‘In 
reference to X, was an informal gift or payment expected or requested?’ where X is seeking 
access to utilities, permits, licenses, and during tax inspections. The question is worded so as 
not to incriminate the respondent or the firm. As such, it should serve as a better proxy for 
firms’ engagement in corruption than survey questions which use explicit language related to 
bribery. 
The second measure of corruption is the percentage of firms who identify corruption as the 
biggest obstacle they face. While our first measure captures more directly firms’ broad 
experience of corruption, our second measure is useful because it asks firms to situate 
corruption in a hierarchy of difficulties rather than stating simply that corruption is a problem. 
The validity of Obstacle as a measure of corruption is supported by Mawejje and Sebudde 
(forthcoming) who study Ugandan firms, and find a negative correlation between a firm’s 
perception that corruption is a constraint and its expectations about future performance. 
3.2 Measuring Press Freedom 
Our primary measure of press freedom comes from Freedom House, who compiles an index 
based on expert assessments and an in-house analysis of newspapers and a variety of 
governmental and non-governmental sources.6 The index takes values between 0 (best) and 
100 (worst). Furthermore, Freedom House uses a categorical approach based on the value of 
their index, categorising countries into groups that are considered ‘Free’, ‘Partly Free’, and 
‘Not Free’. We employ both the raw index and these categorisations in our analysis. In addition, 
we use an alternative measure of press freedom produced by Reporters Without Borders, which 
produces a global ranking of press freedom based on an expert questionnaire and data on abuses 
and acts of violence against journalists during the period of assessment. 
10 
 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
As the Enterprise Surveys are not carried out in every country in every year, we have an 
unbalanced panel. Our combined dataset consists of 110 countries over the years 2006-2016. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our main variables of interest. On average 15.28 per 
cent of public transactions involved a bribe request but the variation is large – from 0 per cent 
of firms in Estonia to 65.2 per cent in the Republic of Yemen. Interestingly, while Yemen 
registers as a corrupt country and is generally perceived to be so, some other countries that are 
often ranked as highly corrupt perform well on this metric. For example, the data for Eritrea 
suggest that no firms paid bribes. This might indicate that firms in some autocracies may be 
less willing to answer due to fear of reprisal (Shockley et al., 2017), reinforcing the need to 
control for democracy and political freedoms, and supporting our decision to use a corruption 
outcome – Obstacle – that does not refer explicitly to firms’ involvement in bribery.7 On 
average, 7.39 per cent of firms view corruption as the biggest obstacle to their operations, 
varying from zero in some countries to a high of 32.5 per cent in Panama. Thus, there is a large 
spread of corruption outcomes across the world. 
Similarly, there is considerable variation in press freedom. Norway is the country with the best 
press freedom score from 2005 to 2016, with an average of 10. North Korea is the worst, 
averaging 97 during this period. Overall, the average value of press freedom in our dataset is 
53, varying substantially across groups of countries with an average score of 22 in the OECD, 
58 in sub-Saharan Africa, 41 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 67 in the Middle East and 
North Africa, and 59 in South Asia. 
3.4 Empirical Approach 
Throughout this study we estimate equations of the following form: 
Corruptionit = β0 + β1Pressit + βxit + εit 
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Where Corruptionit reflects the average corruption experience of firms in country i and time t, 
Pressit is a measure of press freedom,  xit is a vector of controls, and εit is an error of the usual 
type. In addition, we control for a variety of factors that have been identified in the previous 
literature on corruption and press freedom namely democracy (using the Polity IV index), GDP 
per capita, and openness to international trade (defined as exports plus imports as a share of 
GDP). These latter two variables come from the World Development Indicators. 
The correlation of press freedom with its lag is 0.9944; and so, given the time invariance of our 
main variable of interest we do not estimate fixed effects models, using instead pooled OLS as 
our main estimation method. Following existing studies (Brunetti and Weder, 2003; 
Chowdhury, 2004; Kalenborn and Lessmann, 2013) we also estimate random effects models 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity, though we acknowledge that the random effects 
assumption may not be valid as the country specific effect is plausibly correlated with the 
independent variables. Our preferred specification, therefore, is to include dummies for sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, and OECD countries, and year dummies. These 
should capture broad cultural, historical, political, and economic traits and trends. Such traits 
surely matter, as Scholtens and Dam (2007) find that cultural values are associated with 
business ethics; in particular, that firms in countries with high individualism scores pay more 
attention to their ethical polices, including governance of corruption and bribery. 
Several previous studies have employed instrumental variable strategies to deal with concerns 
regarding endogeneity. Instruments such as the share of the population that are protestants and 
the share that speak a major European language have been used (Brunetti and Weder, 2003), 
as well as ethnic fractionalisation and legal origin (Chowdhury, 2004). The notion that these 
country traits only influence corruption via an effect on press freedom is highly debateable and 
in any event these instrument sets fail standard diagnostics in the case of our corruption 
measures, which are based on experiences of corruption. Indeed, it is very difficult to envision 
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an instrument that would satisfy the exclusion restriction. Essentially one would need to think 
of a historical or cultural variable that had no plausible direct effect on corruption. We proceed 
with a careful analysis of the data and refrain from employing causal language. Documenting 
robust associations between corruption and press freedom is a valuable exercise which can 
provide useful insights that can help to inform policymakers and corporate decision-making. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Min Max SD 
Bribe 193 15.28 0.00 65.20 14.39 
Obstacle 193 7.39 0.00 32.50 5.98 
Press freedom 193 52.90 10.00 95.00 19.63 
Tax 193 14.75 0.00 66.70 14.89 
Construction 193 24.36 0.00 91.60 19.39 
Water 182 15.99 0.00 79.30 18.77 
Electricity 191 16.58 0.00 71.10 16.64 
Import 191 15.12 0.00 87.70 18.79 
Operating 191 16.58 0.00 100.00 18.41 
General gift 191 26.05 0.00 90.70 20.44 
Government contract 190 31.30 0.00 99.10 21.79 
Democracy (Polity IV) 193 4.46 -9.00 10.00 5.44 
GDP per capita (log) 193 7.92 5.41 10.89 1.19 
Openness 193 0.84 0.20 2.12 0.37 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Main Results 
Our main findings are presented in Table 2. Columns 1–3 report estimates for our main 
dependent variable of interest – Bribe – the percentage of public transactions in which a gift or 
informal payment was requested by a public official. The first column is our base specification; 
the second column presents estimates from a random effects model, and the third column adds 
dummy variables to our base specification that capture broad global heterogeneities. Columns 
4–6 repeat these specifications using Obstacle – the percentage of firms who identify 
corruption as their biggest obstacle. 
With regard to our first dependent variable, we find that a free press is associated with a 
statistically significant reduction in Bribe. This relationship holds in our random effects model, 
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which allows for unobserved heterogeneity, and when global dummy variables are added to 
our base specification. Moreover, the effect of press freedom is substantial: a one standard 
deviation improvement in press freedom (19.63) is associated with a reduction in the proportion 
of public interactions in which a bribe was requested of 4.1 per cent on average, a substantial 
change when one considers that the mean bribe in our sample is approximately 15 per cent 
(with a standard deviation of 14 per cent). 
For our second dependent variable, we find a strong association between a free press and 
Obstacle – the percentage of firms who identify corruption as their biggest obstacle. We find 
that fewer firms in countries with press freedom report that corruption is their biggest 
constraint, and that this association holds across all of our alternative specifications. Our 
findings therefore support the notion that a free press serves as an effective deterrent to 
corruption in business. In Table A1 in the Appendix, we present estimates of the association 
between corruption and the disaggregated components of Freedom House’s index. These 
components are highly correlated but the tests show the strongest associations for the political 
and legal components of the index. 
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Table 2. Corruption and Press Freedom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS RE OLS OLS RE OLS 
 Bribe Bribe Bribe Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle 
       
Press freedom 0.21*** 0.18** 0.17** 0.10*** 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.076) (0.087) (0.077) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) 
Democracy -0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.21 0.18 0.18 
 (0.281) (0.318) (0.284) (0.132) (0.146) (0.132) 
GDP per capita (log) -5.14*** -4.72*** -5.81*** 0.01 -0.18 0.05 
 (0.907) (1.082) (1.134) (0.419) (0.436) (0.541) 
Openness (log) 3.71 3.37 2.48 2.03** 1.99* 2.12** 
 (2.262) (2.575) (2.214) (1.021) (1.128) (1.015) 
OECD   -1.69   -2.97* 
   (2.194)   (1.532) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -7.80**   -0.90 
   (3.181)   (1.387) 
Latin America, Caribbean   -13.83***   0.40 
   (4.727)   (2.453) 
Constant 43.37*** 44.37*** 43.40*** 1.47 4.34 -2.22 
 (9.291) (10.162) (11.574) (4.239) (4.448) (5.899) 
       
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 
R-squared 0.364 0.349 0.415 0.100 0.091 0.119 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3 presents estimates using alternative measures of press freedom and corruption. 
Columns 1–2 report estimates using Bribe and Obstacle as dependent variables and Freedom 
House’s categories of press freedom as explanatory variables. This scale ranks countries as 
‘Free’ (0–30), ‘Partly Free’ (31–60), and ‘Not Free’ (61–100). This is a worthwhile exercise as 
small changes in the score may not be meaningful and there could conceivably be threshold 
levels of press freedom required for the relationship with corruption to become meaningful. 
Column 1 demonstrates that relative to ‘Free’ being ‘Not Free’ is associated with an increase 
in Bribe. More specifically, Bribe is 10 per cent higher in ‘Not Free’ countries relative to ‘Free’ 
countries. Interestingly, there is no statistically significant difference between countries with 
partly free as opposed to full press freedom. Countries that lack a free press or have a partly 
free press do appreciably worse on Obstacle. Columns 3–4 repeat these specifications, 
substituting Freedom House’s indicator of press freedom with the Reporters Without Borders’ 
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indicator. These tests show that an increase in press freedom is associated with less corruption 
across both measures of corruption.  
Columns 5–7 present estimates using an alternative measure of corruption – the percentage of 
firms expected to give gifts to public officials ‘to get things done’. The underling survey 
question is: 
We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal 
payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent of total annual sales, or 
estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments 
or gifts to public officials for this purpose? 
The question is worded so that respondents will not incriminate themselves; instead of being 
asked whether their firm is expected to give gifts, it refers to ‘establishments like this one’. Our 
central result is robust to several of these alternative indicators of corruption and press freedom. 
In column 5, our continuous measure of press freedom is not associated with corruption, as 
measured by informal gifts. However, the association is strong in columns 6 and 7, which use 
Reporters Without Borders’ and Freedom House’s categorical indicator respectively. Together, 
these findings suggest that there is a meaningful association between corruption in business 
and press freedom across multiple indicators. 
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Table 3. Robustness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Bribe Obstacle Bribe Obstacle Gift Gift Gift 
        
Freedom House 
‘Not Free’ 
10.05*** 8.12***     13.85*** 
 (3.417) (1.502)     (4.764) 
Freedom House 
‘Partly Free’ 
0.08 5.65***     6.11** 
 (1.823) (1.213)     (2.931) 
RWB Press Rank   0.08*** 0.04***  0.10**  
   (0.027) (0.014)  (0.041)  
Press freedom     0.17   
     (0.120)   
Democracy 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.17 -0.35 -0.31 -0.24 
 (0.301) (0.114) (0.241) (0.120) (0.431) (0.355) (0.434) 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
-5.88*** 0.48 -5.65*** 0.19 -6.22*** -5.93*** -5.69*** 
 (1.105) (0.534) (1.158) (0.540) (1.566) (1.572) (1.489) 
Openness (log) 2.03 2.42** 3.78 2.80*** 5.16 6.83* 5.30 
 (2.141) (0.964) (2.347) (1.053) (3.273) (3.513) (3.240) 
OECD -3.75 -1.68 -2.67 -3.52** 1.55 0.59 1.94 
 (2.328) (1.490) (2.019) (1.433) (2.896) (2.989) (3.163) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
-7.29** -0.18 -6.28* 0.09 -5.79 -3.71 -4.64 
 (3.068) (1.385) (3.324) (1.467) (4.368) (4.726) (4.281) 
Latin America, 
Caribbean 
-
12.63*** 
0.38 -12.13** 1.39 -
15.46*** 
-13.64** -
14.78*** 
 (4.737) (2.361) (4.679) (2.426) (5.766) (5.837) (5.669) 
Constant 46.06*** -7.22 60.34*** 1.52 88.48*** 85.16*** 62.73*** 
 (9.935) (5.226) (11.770) (5.384) (18.506) (17.362) (14.455) 
        
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 193 193 193 193 191 191 191 
R-squared 0.452 0.197 0.418 0.128 0.373 0.387 0.391 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.2 Collusive and Extortive Corruption 
As noted above, acts of bribery can be categorised as collusive or extortive and the question of 
what type of corruption the press is most effective at combatting has not been addressed 
empirically in the existing literature. While the press could, in principle, serve as an effective 
deterrent to both types, Brunetti and Weder (2003) argue that the press may be the most 
effective institution at fighting collusive corruption given that official state anti-corruption 
institutions may themselves be corrupted. Moreover, the competitive forces and nature of 
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journalism may make collusive conspiracies more attractive targets from the perspective of 
journalists. 
Therefore, we extend our analysis to consider the role of press freedom in several different 
contexts. We examine each of the disaggregated components of the Bribe variable; that is, the 
percentage of firms who say that a gift was expected or requested during meetings with tax 
officials; when obtaining construction permits; water connections; electrical connections; 
import licenses, and operating licenses. In addition, we examine the association between 
corruption and press freedom in cases where firms say they are expected to give gifts in order 
to secure government contracts. 
Columns 1–7 report estimates using each of these outcomes as a dependent variable, 
respectively. Panel A presents estimates using Freedom House’s continuous indicator of press 
freedom and Panel B reports estimates using their categorisation of countries as ‘Free’, ‘Partly 
Free’, and ‘Not Free’. While these data do not allow us to claim that every act of bribery in a 
given context is collusive or extortive, certain categories are more likely to feature a dominant 
type of arrangement. The first two columns consider the contexts of tax and construction. 
Collusive corruption is likely to be the dominant mode of corruption in these contexts as a firm 
has no incentive to report corruption and it is difficult for other officials to detect misreporting 
on the part of the bribed official (Brunetti and Weder, 2003).8 In both panels, we find 
statistically significant relationships between press freedom and the incidence of bribery in 
these contexts. 
Columns 3-6 examine situations that more closely fit the concept of extortive corruption as 
outlined in Brunetti and Weder (2003). In these types of interaction, the firm faces a bribe 
demand from an official who controls access to a government service. The official can deny or 
delay the firm. The Enterprise Surveys contain information on bribery in the pursuit of water 
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and electrical connections, and import and operating licences. Neither of these situations shows 
any significant association with press freedom. With respect to the incidence of bribery for 
firms seeking operating licences, we do find an association in Panel B. Countries with unfree 
presses are countries in which more firms pay bribes for operating licences.9  
The final column examines corruption in the context of seeking government contracts. 
Corruption in public procurement is a perennial and serious issue that can involve substantial 
sums. We do not find a significant association between press freedom and this type of 
corruption. Given that such cases are of great interest to the public, this is somewhat surprising 
and suggests that there are limits to the free press’ ability to expose corruption. 
Overall, these findings support the notion that the press is an effective external institution when 
it comes to reducing collusive corruption. Indeed, it is only effective at fighting such corruption 
and the lack of an association with extortive corruption fits with a rational disinterest on the 
part of a profit maximising media industry. An alternative explanation is simply that taxes and 
construction are more salient to media consumers and therefore the press has a stronger 
incentive to investigate these types of interaction between firm and state, irrespective of their 
collusive of extortive character. In either case, we can conclude that the press is an effective 
deterrent against only certain types of corruption. 
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Table 4. Corruption in All Contexts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Collusive Collusive Extortive Extortive Extortive Extortive Procuremen
t  
Tax Constructio
n 
 
Water Electric Import Operatin
g 
Government 
contract 
        
Panel A: Continuous Press Freedom 
Press  0.19** 0.19* 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.15 
freedom (0.082) (0.108) (0.118) (0.079) (0.123) (0.102) (0.129) 
Constant 59.89**
* 
76.28*** 78.73**
* 
79.36**
* 
74.41**
* 
73.41**
* 
80.00*** 
 (13.219) (16.702) (18.691) (13.109) (19.090) (15.988) (20.030) 
R-squared 0.411 0.352 0.321 0.427 0.250 0.282 0.269 
        
Panel B: Categorical Press Freedom 
FH ‘Not 10.78**
* 
10.09** 6.94 6.06 4.58 11.09** 9.74 
Free’ (3.544) (4.956) (5.305) (3.763) (5.107) (4.366) (6.574) 
FH ‘Partly 0.34 -2.02 -1.36 -0.87 -4.45 -0.94 4.90 
Free’ (1.820) (3.497) (3.543) (2.157) (2.861) (3.399) (4.589) 
Constant 46.50**
* 
66.49*** 73.67**
* 
80.06**
* 
47.70**
* 
61.06**
* 
79.01*** 
 (10.444) (15.225) (14.664) (12.496) (16.046) (12.966) (19.796) 
R-squared 0.446 0.383 0.338 0.445 0.279 0.324 0.274 
        
Observation
s 
193 193 182 191 191 191 190 
Year dumm. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5. Democracy 
One may suspect that only democracies have a free press. In this view, our measure of press 
freedom simply captures the effect of democratic institutions and is too highly correlated with 
our measure of democracy. Figure 1 illustrates the association between press freedom and 
democracy. The solid reference lines denote the generally accepted thresholds for full 
democracy (Polity IV score > 6) and press freedom (Freedom House ‘Free’ category = [0, 30]) 
and thus allow us to divide our data into democracies and non-democracies that have or do not 
have a free press. The dashed reference line indicates the threshold separating Freedom 
House’s ‘Free’ and ‘Partly Free’ press freedom categories. The results of this exercise confirm 
that democracy and press freedom often go together and that the co-occurrence of autocracy 
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and press freedom is extremely rare. In fact, we find only one case – Suriname – that technically 
qualifies as a non-democracy with a free press. Interestingly, we do observe full democracies, 
such as Turkey and Pakistan, which are ranked as ‘Not Free’ according to Freedom House’s 
categorisation. There are also a substantial number of countries with a democratic government 
but only a partly free press. In summary, any combination of democracy and press freedom is 
technically possible. 
 
Figure 1. Press Freedom and Democracy 
One might ask also if a free press is particularly effective in countries with democratic, that is 
accountable, institutions. This is important from a policymaking standpoint as efforts to 
promote a free press may only combat corruption in such environments – perhaps as the press 
only has the power to expose, not punish. Businesses may also benefit from an appreciation of 
the interactions between various institutions before undertaking activities in a country. The 
hypothesis that democracy moderates the effect of press freedom on corruption has 
considerable support in the literature that measures corruption using the CPI and other 
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perception based indices. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2015), for example, develop and test a 
model of the role of media freedom and democratic institutions, finding that both complement 
each other in the fight against corruption in a panel of 129 countries from 1980 to 2007. 
Kalenborn and Lessmann (2013) analyse the joint impact of democracy and press freedom on 
corruption, finding that both are complementary rather than substitutes, in a cross-section of 
170 countries from 2005 to 2010 as well as a panel of 175 countries from 1996 to 2010. A 
further study finds that the association between a free press and corruption is moderated by the 
level of political and social openness, often but not exclusively a feature of democracy (Charron 
2009).  
Table 5 introduces an interaction term between democracy and press freedom to our main 
specification. When we considered the additive effects of these variables in Table 2, only press 
freedom is associated with corruption – the level of democracy is statistically insignificant. 
When interacted, however, the interaction term captures the possibility that different 
combinations of press freedom and democracy have compound effects that are greater than the 
sum of their separate effects. Columns 1–3 present estimates for our main dependent variables 
– Bribe, Obstacle, and Tax. We include the latter variable in our tests because of our previous 
finding which suggested that press freedom is more likely to play a role in this specific 
context.10 
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Table 5. Democracy, Press Freedom, and Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Bribe Obstacle Tax 
    
Press freedom 0.01 -0.00 0.04 
 (0.117) (0.049) (0.092) 
Democracy -1.92** -0.90** -0.99** 
 (0.968) (0.416) (0.412) 
Press freedom*Democracy 0.03** 0.01*** 1.55*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.525) 
GDP per capita (log) -5.10*** 0.43 -5.16*** 
 (1.134) (0.569) (1.087) 
Openness (log) 3.16 2.49** 2.82 
 (2.222) (1.011) (2.233) 
OECD -1.01 -2.60* -3.73 
 (2.227) (1.461) (2.392) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -8.80*** -1.44 -9.02*** 
 (3.124) (1.393) (3.218) 
Latin America, Caribbean -14.11*** 0.24 -13.17*** 
 (4.690) (2.440) (4.839) 
Constant 68.95*** 6.86 68.38*** 
 (12.781) (5.979) (13.359) 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Observations 193 193 193 
R-squared 0.436 0.154 0.453 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We find that the interaction term is statistically significant in all models where it is included, 
suggesting that the effect of press freedom is moderated by the level of democracy. Figure 2 
graphs the marginal effect of press freedom at different levels of democracy across our three 
corruption indicators, holding our control variables constant at mean values. Recall that higher 
values of the Freedom House metric indicate worse levels of press freedom. For all of our 
measures of corruption, close to the commonly accepted threshold of six on the Polity IV scale 
we find that improvements in press freedom are associated with better corruption outcomes 
and the effect becomes stronger as we move along the democratic axis. There is no statistically 
significant marginal effect of press freedom at lower Polity IV scores. 
Therefore, press freedom, on average, plays an important role in democratic countries and in 
those transitioning to democracy or backsliding to non-democratic government. Business 
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pursuing opportunities in such emerging markets may find it useful to consider the press 
freedom in such countries. Even if our association of interest is evident only in democracies, it 
is still the case that it is evident for the majority of our observations. Specifically, freedom of 
the press is associated with a reduction in corruption in 116 out of 193 of our observations. 
This exercise confirms that our main results are not only applicable to a few democratic 
countries that happen to enjoy press freedom. 
 
Figure 2. The Marginal Effect of Press Freedom on Corruption at Varying Levels of 
Democracy 
6. Conclusion 
The important role of an independent media in combating corruption will come as no surprise 
to scholars of business ethics. Many studies have demonstrated a strong link between media 
attention and enhanced corporate governance and decision-making. The role of the media is 
evident in cases such as the release of the Panama Papers and the Paradise papers, which 
revealed the widespread use of offshore financial centers for illegal purposes. Such 
investigative journalism often comes at a high price; according to Transparency International 
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(2017), 368 journalists were murdered between 2012 and 2017 – at least 70 of who were 
investigating corruption-related cases. 
What has received less attention is the role of an independent media in constraining less 
sensational types of corruption in business, such as small bribes to obtain licenses and permits. 
Previous work presents strong evidence that the media shapes perceptions of corruption, but 
no previous studies consider its role in shaping everyday corruption, as seen through the eyes 
of ordinary businesses. Furthermore, previous studies do not show which type of corrupt acts 
– extortive or collusive – that the media is more effective at exposing. Our findings suggest 
that press freedom helps to combat everyday corruption in business-state interactions. 
Countries with greater press freedom have significantly lower incidences of bribery involving 
public officials, and fewer businesses in these countries report that corruption is the biggest 
problem they face. Moreover, a free press is associated with a substantial reduction in the 
percentage of firms that say a bribe was expected or requested during interactions with tax 
officials and in pursuit of construction permits. Finally, it appears that press freedom is most 
effective in combating collusive corruption, and that its impact is highly concentrated in 
democracies and near-democratic societies. 
Corruption provides some businesses with unfair advantages while raising the cost of doing 
business for all. It is possible that larger firms are targeted for bribes and are better able to 
absorb such costs Therefore, our findings suggest that press freedom may help to ensure a level 
playing field and reduce significantly the cost of doing business. For businesses, our findings 
suggest that understanding the media environment should be essential for firms engaging in 
cross-border activities. For governments and policymakers, our findings suggest that press 
freedom is an important weapon in the fight against corruption domestically and globally. 
International efforts to control corruption such as the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention should 
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be matched by efforts to promote press freedom; which, although it is considered a fundamental 
human right in several international treaties, is continuously under threat across the globe.11 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Political, Legal, and Economic Components of Press Freedom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Bribe Bribe Bribe Bribe Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle 
         
FH Legal 0.45**   0.22 0.22**   0.09 
 (0.199)   (0.309) (0.110)   (0.222) 
FH Political  0.39**  0.24  0.19**  0.10 
  (0.175)  (0.254)  (0.082)  (0.137) 
FH Economic   0.43* 0.02   0.23* 0.05 
   (0.256) (0.333)   (0.121) (0.213) 
Democracy 0.04 0.02 -0.10 0.08 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.18 
 (0.281) (0.271) (0.253) (0.286) (0.134) (0.132) (0.121) (0.137) 
GDP per capita (log) -5.98*** -5.79*** -6.15*** -5.77*** -0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.06 
 (1.134) (1.150) (1.169) (1.144) (0.546) (0.544) (0.529) (0.545) 
Openness (log) 2.20 2.92 1.81 2.70 1.98* 2.33** 1.79* 2.18** 
 (2.199) (2.266) (2.166) (2.224) (1.009) (1.030) (0.995) (1.044) 
OECD -2.07 -2.29 -1.31 -2.06 -3.17** -3.28** -2.73* -3.06* 
 (2.243) (2.141) (2.280) (2.303) (1.553) (1.508) (1.645) (1.654) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -8.00** -7.54** -8.71*** -7.57** -1.01 -0.79 -1.33 -0.84 
 (3.135) (3.244) (3.215) (3.202) (1.390) (1.418) (1.380) (1.440) 
Latin America, Caribbean -13.64*** -14.48*** -13.32*** -14.11*** 0.49 0.08 0.67 0.33 
 (4.715) (4.856) (4.727) (4.828) (2.464) (2.484) (2.420) (2.479) 
Constant 64.34*** 62.44*** 66.78*** 61.04*** 4.33 3.44 5.03 2.55 
 (11.718) (12.169) (12.347) (12.244) (5.806) (5.569) (5.468) (5.670) 
         
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.413 0.414 0.408 0.416 0.115 0.117 0.111 0.119 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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1 See for example the literature on corruption’s effect on growth (Mauro, 1995), investment 
(Wei, 2000), and poverty and inequality (Gupta et al., 2002). 
2 These papers were released by Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), a German newspaper with the 
cooperation of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). 
3 In addition to these direct costs, recent studies also find that corruption affects the business 
environment through excessive red tape (Breen and Gillanders, 2012), less efficient public 
investment (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001), and poor infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; 
Kenny, 2009; Gillanders, 2014), not to mention broader negative effects on society. 
4 The empirical literature is largely uniform on this point. However, Vaidya (2005) presents a 
theoretical model that allows for collusion between an independent media and government. 
The model suggests that perverse incentives are possible which favour corruption. 
5 This argument is in line with the implications from an emerging literature that sees the 
business press as an information intermediary (Bushee et al, 2010; Cohen et al, 2017). Also, 
see Dyck et al. (2008) for a further analysis of the corporate governance role of the media. 
6 The full methodology can be found at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2017-
methodology. 
7 Our results are robust to dropping the three countries in which no firms report any bribery. 
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8 Brunetti and Weder (2003) consider construction permits as extortive but we think it fits better 
as collusive. Should the act of corruption be revealed, the firm stands to lose a costly premises 
or otherwise face serious costs if it should not have gotten the permit in the first place. In other 
permitting cases, the firm may wish to reveal corruption has taken place as it was entitled to 
the service and faced predatory behaviour from an official. 
9 This finding is interesting in light of Djankov et al. (2002), who find that countries with 
heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption. 
10 There was no statistically significant association in the other contexts in business in which 
we tested the interaction of democracy and press freedom. 
11 See Article 19 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950). 
